Empirical estimates of price elasticities of demand (PED) for pharmaceuticals suggest that they are relatively price inelastic. However, in many settings, a medication and its substitutes and complements face simultaneous differential changes in prices that affect the observed "composite" PED. We exploit an implementation of a value-based formulary (VBF) that utilized drug-specific incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) to inform drug copayments, resulting in increases in copayments for some medications and decreases in copayments for others. We first show theoretically that by changing the price of a medication and its substitute in opposite directions, VBF designs can leverage cross-price effects to increase the range of composite PEDs. We then empirically estimate PED and welfare effects using a consumer surplus approach. Overall PED was −0.16, similar to the RAND Health Insurance Experiment estimate. However, there was substantial dispersion of PED across the VBF copayment tiers ranging from −0.09 to −0.87 with a statistically significant trend aligned with the levels of value as reflected by the ICER estimates (p < 0.001). The net welfare increase was $147,000 for the cohort or $28 per member over the postpolicy year. Further experimentations of VBF designs with alternative cost-effectiveness thresholds, copayment levels and value definitions could be quite promising for improving welfare. 
| INTRODUCTION
Own price elasticity of demand (PED) reflects the responsiveness in demand for a product with respect to its price, ceteris paribus. There is a large literature that has tried to estimate PED of health care products, including pharmaceuticals, with the RAND Health Insurance Experiment being the first to estimate PED in a randomized context (Keeler & Rolph, 1988; Manning et al., 1987) . The study found an overall PED estimate for pharmaceuticals of −0.17, which means that a 10% increase in cost sharing results in a 1.7% reduction in utilization of pharmaceuticals. More recent observational studies have produced overall PED estimates on drug costs ranging from −0.33 to −0.12. (Chandra, Gruber, & McKnight, 2010; Chandra, Gruber, & McKnight, 2014; Contoyannis, Hurley, Grootendorst, Jeon, & Tamblyn, 2005; Gilman & Kautter, 2008; Joyce, Escarce, Solomon, & Goldman, 2002) Based on these estimates, it is usually inferred that pharmaceuticals are price inelastic in nature. These estimates have been used for a variety of purposes such as setting optimal coinsurance rates and calculating welfare implications for policies.
Typically, when estimating PED, pharmaceutical products are thought of as one monolithic product. Analysts then exploit some natural experiments, most commonly increases in cost sharing to pharmaceutical products, to estimate the responsiveness of pharmaceutical demand with respect to changes in such cost sharing. However, within the same setting, when one tries to look at the price responsiveness of specific pharmaceuticals or classes of pharmaceuticals, one is no longer able to estimate the true own PED for that class. This is because, this class of pharmaceuticals may have substitutes and complements whose demand prices are also affected by the same natural experiment. Further, the increase in cost sharing may occur differentially, with cost sharing increases being greater for branded medications than for generic medications (Gibson, McLaughlin, & Smith, 2005) and greater for nonpreferred branded medications than for preferred branded medications (Chandra et al., 2010; Gaynor, Li, & Vogt, 2007; Landsman, Yu, Liu, Teutsch, & Berger, 2005) . Therefore, the ceteris paribus argument no longer applies. Indeed, such cross-price effects could affect any formulary that makes simultaneous changes in prices. For example, the increased use in the past decade of drug coinsurance or high deductibles within US formularies would affect the consumer price of drugs differentially (due to drug-specific differences in plan acquisition cost), leading to potential substitution (Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, 2017) . To our knowledge, this limitation of interpreting estimated PED for specific classes of drugs, when the entire pharmaceutical demand is affected via price changes, has not been discussed adequately in the literature. It is expected that estimates of PED for pharmaceuticals would vary considerably depending on how their substitutes' and complements' demand prices were also changing.
The dispersion in PED may be even greater when some drugs experience cost-sharing increases whereas others experience decreases as in the context of transitioning to a value-based formulary (VBF). In contrast to the typical unidirectional increases in cost sharing used to estimate PED in other natural experiments, a VBF assigns drugs to tiers using some notion of value (e.g., in terms of patient health net of costs) rather than acquisition costs thereby aligning cost-sharing levels with value (Fendrick, Smith, Chernew, & Shah, 2001) . A VBF can decrease cost sharing for drugs with high-value estimates while increasing cost sharing for drugs with low-value estimates, thereby further incentivizing substitution of low value for high-value utilization.
In this article, we develop a simple intuitive formulation for the composite PED (as a function of own and cross PED) within a VBF and provide empirical estimates of these composite PEDs at the drug level and aggregate them to estimate the overall elasticity of pharmaceuticals and by medication copayment tier and a few prevalent drug classes elasticities through a recent natural experiment of VBF implementation. Finally, we provide a framework for welfare calculation for VBF implementation and provide estimates from the natural experiment.
| THEORY

| Demand as a function of own and cross-price effects
The level of demand for a particular (index) medication depends on both the price of the medication and the prices of its substitutes or complements. As there are fewer examples of complement pharmaceutical pairs as compared with substitutes, 1 we will focus the discussion on substitutes. However, the same framework can be used for complements and a mix of substitutes and complements. In the context of the typical overall changes in cost sharing in cost-based formularies, the demand for the index medication will depend on its own and cross PED and the relative changes in prices of the medications. We first illustrate this with an example involving only two medications, then we extend our example to multiple medications and then to an example involving value-based cost sharing. For two medications, the demand for Medication 1 (D 1 ) is a function of the (demand) price of both Medication 1 (P 1 ) and Medication 2 (P 2 ).
The total change in demand for Medication 1 (dD 1 ) is a function of the changes in prices, dP 1 and dP 2 , and the effect of the changes in prices on the demand for Medication 1:
1 It is far more clinically common for medications to be substitutable (e.g., different antihypertensives may be used interchangeably (or in interchangeable combinations) in order to achieve a targeted blood pressure goal as evidenced by recommendations from national clinical bodies (e.g., the American College of Cardiology and American Heart Association and the Joint National Committee on Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure), than for medications to be complementary (e.g., combination highly active antiretroviral therapy, although even in this case, many of the complementary active ingredients have been developed into a single combination pill).
Note that in (2), the cross-price effect,
, can also be written as the product of the marginal rate of substitution between the two drugs and the own price elasticity of Medication 2, that is,
<0, which implies that
>0;it indicates that Medications 1 and 2 are substitutes.
Multiplying both sides of ( (2)) with
, where P 1 and D 1 represent the mean price and demand, we have
Therefore, the "composite" PED for the index medication with respect to its own price, denoted by
, is comprised of (a) the true own PED of Medication 1 (η 11 ) and (b) a second term representing the product of the true cross PED of Medication 1 with respect to Medication 2 prices (η 12 ) and the elasticity of price of Medication 2 relative to Medication 1 prices (ε 21 ).
This shows that the overall elasticity of demand for Medication 1 will depend on whether Medications 1 and 2 are substitutes (η 12 > 0) or complements (η 12 < 0) and on the relative change in the price of Medication 2 with respect to Medication 1. For example, if Medications 1 and 2 are substitutes (η 12 > 0) and the relative change in the price of Medication 2 is large (ε 21 > > 1), then it is possible that overall elasticity of demand for Medication 1 is positive despite the own PED for Medication 1 being negative (η 11 < 0).
Generalizing our model to J medications, we see that the overall elasticity of demand for Medication 1, θ 11 , is the sum of η 11 plus the sum of the product of the cross PED for Medication 1 with respect to medication j prices (η 1j ) and the elasticity of prices for medication j with respect to Medication 1 (ε j1 ):
| Implications of VBF on price responsiveness
The VBF structurally influences the elasticity of relative (demand) prices (ε j1 ) so that low-value drugs experience large positive price changes, and high-value drugs experience small positive or even negative price changes. Therefore, a highvalue drug that has low own price elasticity (i.e., is inelastic) can be made even more price inelastic in a VBF setting by increasing the relative prices of its low-valued substitutes. In fact, if the increases in prices of the low-value drugs were large enough, it is possible that increase in price of the high-value drug would still lead to increase in consumption of the drug leading to welfare gains. These dynamics are fundamental to understanding the welfare effects of a VBF policy and are described below. Following our stylized example above, let us consider two drugs that are substitutes. Also, let us assume for simplicity that P 1 ¼ P 2 . Then under a traditional unidirectional shift in cost sharing, ε j1 = 1, and the overall PED for Drug 1 is given as
Certainly, θ 11, Tr > η 11 as η 12 > 0, indicating that in a traditional setting, demand price shifts for all drugs in the same direction would produce more inelastic demand estimates than the true own price elasticity.
Under a VBF setting, suppose Drug 2 is of lower value. So a VBF would separate the demand price for the two drugs making Drug 2 more expensive than Drug 1. There are two ways a VBF can enforce price changes: (a) dP 1 > 0 and dP 2 > > 0 or (b) dP 1 < 0 and dP 2 > 0. Note, however, if dP 1 > 0 and dP 2 >> 0: η 11 < 0; η 12 > 0; ε 21 > 1 ➜ θ 11 > θ 11;Tr > η 11
Thus, if higher value Drug 1 experiences a price increase, the VBF makes its demand more inelastic by changing the price of its lower value substitutes even higher. Thus, not as many beneficiaries are deterred from using the higher value Drug 1 despite an increase in price. In fact, it is possible that overall elasticity for a good-value drug could even be positive under the VBF setting-that is, consumption of a drug may increase despite price increases if the price increase for its substitute is sufficiently high. In contrast, if dP 1 < 0 and dP 2 > 0: η 11 < 0; η 12 > 0; ε 21 < 0 ➜ θ 11 < η 11 < θ 11;Tr Thus, if the high-value drug experiences a decrease in price, the VBF makes its demand more elastic to allow more people to take up the drug.
One can also look at the effect of VBF on the price elasticities of the low-value drugs. If we reverse the order and now consider Drug 1 to be the low-valued drug and Drug 2 to be the high-valued drug, then if dP 1 >> 0 and dP 2 > 0: η 11s < 0; η 12 > 0; ε 21 < 1 ➜ θ 11;Tr > θ 11 > η 11
Similarly,
if dP 1 > 0 and dP 2 < 0: η 11 < 0; η 12 > 0; ε 21 < 0 ➜ θ 11 < η 11 < θ 11;Tr
With a price increase for the low-value drug, the VBF makes the demand for the low-value drug more elastic than in the traditional setting thus encouraging beneficiaries to reduce use of this drug.
| Welfare effects of the VBF
Following traditional economic theory, the true own PED is assumed to be negative, implying that as demand price falls, consumption increases ceteris paribus. Insured patients pay a fraction of the price of a drug. It is expected that there is an inherent welfare loss due to moral hazard, as patients would consume the drug even when its marginal value is lower than its marginal price. If the demand is price elastic (inelastic), as would be expected with a low (high)-value drug, the moral hazard would be large (small; Zeckhauser, 1970) .
For drugs whose demand prices increase (decrease), we expect that there will be welfare gains (loss) due to moral hazard. However in the VBF setting, by aligning these price changes with the underlying value of drugs, the VBF may employ the elasticity differences between low-and high-value drugs to affect welfare (assuming that lower value drugs on average have higher elasticities). Therefore, in a VBF, the expected welfare loss from a price decrease for a high-value drug will be less than the expected welfare loss averted from a price increase (of the same magnitude) for a low-value drug. Consequently, we expect that, on average, the change in welfare loss brought about by a VBF design that is able to align demand with value will be positive.
Consider that copayments (demand price) levels changed from level P 1 to P 1 * for a drug, and the long-run social marginal costs denoted by SMC. 2 The associated change in welfare loss will depend on the following conditions: (a) if P 1 * > or <P 1 and (SMC > P 1 and SMC > P 1 * ) or (b) if P 1 * > or < P 1 and (P 1 * > SMC > P 1 or if P 1 * < SMC < P 1 ) or (c) if P 1 * > or < P 1 and SMC < P 1 and SMC < P 1 * . It is expected that for generic drugs (a) always holds. However, for branded drugs, any of the conditions may hold. Consequently, the welfare calculations for each combination of these conditions are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Assuming that high-value drugs would be, on average, less price elastic than low-value drugs, the welfare losses from price decreases of high-value drugs could be more than offset by the welfare gains from price increases of lowvalue drugs within a VBF. To the extent that these high-value and low-value drugs are substitutes for each other, the total price responsiveness would be tempered for high-value drugs whereas they would be made more sensitive for low-value drugs within a VBF. For example, the overall price responsiveness (say, θ 11 ) for the high-value drug with a decrease in its demand prices could be much lower than its own price elasticity (η 11 ) would suggest as it is reinforced positively by η 12 and ε 21 as both would be positive under a VBF design and ε 21 > 1. Therefore, the welfare loss associated with the decrease in demand price for this drug within a VBF will be smaller than what would be expected if that demand price would have changed ceteris paribus. In essence, a VBF is likely to increase dispersion in price responsiveness of drugs. To what extent a specific VBF design can affect total welfare will require empirical estimation.
| EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE
| Institutional setting and data
In 2010, Premera Blue Cross (Premera), a large nonprofit health plan in the Pacific Northwest implemented a VBF benefit among its employees and dependents, which explicitly used Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to inform medication copayments. The design and implementation of the VBF has been described in detail elsewhere (Sullivan et al., 2015) . Briefly, Premera pharmacists who are trained in economic evaluation gather available CEA estimates and, when necessary, produce de novo estimates. An external panel of clinical, economic, and public experts uses the ICER estimates along with information on additional social or ethical values to assign the medication to the appropriate copayment tier. Medications with high ICERs are placed on high copayment tiers to disincentivize use, and medications with low ICERs are placed on low copayment tiers to incentivize use. Table 1 shows the pharmacy benefits in the prepolicy and postpolicy periods for the intervention and control groups. In the contrast, the medical benefits did not change for the intervention and control groups over the period of observation.
In a separate analysis of the overall effect of the VBF, we have found that there was an increase in the use of medications moved to lower copayment tiers and a decrease in the use of medications moved to the highest tier (Yeung, Basu, Hansen, Watkins, & Sullivan, 2017) . Additional work in subgroups with diabetes or hyperlipidemia suggested that individuals were substituting low-value drugs for high-value drugs within the diabetes and hyperlipidemia drug categories (Yeung, Basu, Marcum, Watkins, & Sullivan, 2017) .
The initial sample was composed of the entire population of employees and dependents aged 0-64 who were covered under preferred provider organization employer sponsored plans administrated by Premera, the largest private health plan in Washington State. The sample was restricted to include only individuals continuously enrolled at least 1 year prior to VBF implementation. The intervention group was composed of employees and dependents of Premera in an employer sponsored plan that implemented the VBF on July 2010. The control group was composed of employees and dependents of two employer sponsored plans administrated by Premera that did not implement the VBF. These plans were chosen based on similarity to the intervention group prior to VBF implementation in industry classification, member geography of residence, medication copayment tiers, and without any changes in pharmacy benefits over the entire study period.
From July 2009 through June 2011, we obtained quarterly measures on demographics (age, sex, ZIP code of residence, and relationship to employee) and prescription fills (National Drug Code, hierarchical ingredient code, therapeutic class, brand-generic status, number of days' supply, date dispensed, and place of purchase [retail or mail order pharmacy]) for each member in our sample. We used data on individual's ZIP code of residence to link to ZIP code-level measures from the 2009-2013 American Community Surveys and 2010 US Census, including information on median household income, proportion of urban residents, proportion of African American persons, and proportion of individuals with bachelor's degree (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015a Bureau, , 2015b .
Our focus on health plans that had pharmacy benefit structures consisting of fixed dollar copayments with no deductibles, no coinsurance provisions, no maximum out-of-pocket expenditure limits, and no coverage for outof-network pharmacies results in a linear price schedule for cost sharing. As the copayments were changed exogenously with the VBF implementation in our intervention arm, it allows for a clean medication level analysis. The unique combinations of active ingredient (hierarchical ingredient code), dosage form, and brandgeneric status defined every medication in our data. This is the basic unit by which copayment tiers, including VBF tiers, were assigned. 
| Empirical approach
Our primary goal was to estimate θ 11 for each drug under the exogenous shock in cost sharing generated by a VBF implementation. 3 Our approach to estimation is as follows.
| Demand price or copayment
Our primary explanatory variable was the expected copayment amount for each medication faced by a member in a given quarter. Unfortunately, the tier status of each of these medications, both before and after VBF implementation in the intervention group was not observed in the dataset. However, because of the linear price schedule and the homogenous copayments for each medication, we are able to infer the tiers for each drug based on the observed copayments. Naturally, this approach restricted us to use only those medications that were filled in every quarter of observation by at least one person in the intervention group. This limited our analysis to 269 unique medications, which accounted for 79.3% of the prescription medication volume over the period of observation. We infer these marginal medication-specific copayments for each quarter by calculating the mean copayment observed for retail and mail order claims separately. VBF copayment tier assignments were applied in the same manner for both retail and mail order benefits. However, mail order copayment amounts are 2.5 times the copayment amount for a retail claim but provide three times the quantity of medication (this multiple was not impacted by the VBF). We calculate the weighted mean copayment for every medication in a given quarter by weighting the mean retail and mail copayments in that quarter with the proportion of retail and mail claims for that medication during the prepolicy year. Therefore, the postpolicy quantities do not affect the weighted mean copayment levels, and changes in these demand prices were only driven by the implementation of the VBF formulary, considered to be exogenous in nature. These weighted copayment levels are denoted as factual copayment levels, which represent the mean prices a consumer truly faced for a given medication in a given quarter. The factual copayments were calculated separately for the intervention and control groups. For the intervention group, we also derived the counterfactual copayment for each medication in the postpolicy period for the VBF cohort, reflecting the price a consumer would have faced for a given medication in the postpolicy period for the VBF cohort had the price of the medication not been changed by the VBF policy. These counterfactual copayment levels were based on calculating the medication-specific average copayments during the prepolicy period and then multiplying by prepolicy period mail and retail weights. The control group was used to adjust for any temporal changes during this time period.
| Econometric estimation-utilization
We modeled the probability of filling each medication in a given quarter as well as the number of fills of the medication using two-part models. For each part, we utilized a difference-in-differences estimator to account for unobserved timevarying and nontime-varying confounders. For the first part, we used probit regression to estimate the probability of fill (Equation (1)). For the second part, we used a generalized linear model with a logarithmic link function and a Poisson distribution 4 to estimate the number of days' supply, given a fill (Equation (2)). We combined the first and second part regressions to obtain an overall estimate of the effect of copayment changes on number of fills of a medication per quarter. The two-part model has the following specification:
Part 2: log E number of fills idt
Here, filled idt and number of fills idt are subscripted for individual i, drug d, and quarter t; copay pdt is the mean copayment in the VBF or control groups for drug d at quarter t in health plan p; rx d is a fixed effect for each of the 3 Note that we do not intend or are able to estimate η 11 , which would require an attempt to control for all substitute cost-share changes for each drug; η 11 is also not an interesting parameter by itself as one cannot manipulate it via formulary design. 4 A negative binomial distribution was considered. However, the outcome (count of fills conditional on having a fill) was not overdispersed (variance = 1.0, mean = 1.8) and the Pearson's correlation test, and modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicated similar goodness of fit for both Poisson and negative binomial distribution models.
Quarter indexes trimonthly periods centered on VBF policy implementation (July 2010), and season are fixed effects for quarters (fall, winter, spring, and summer) to account for seasonal effects. Regression covariates in both models also include age, sex, Washington state residence, ZIP code median household income, proportion of urban residents, proportion of African American persons, and proportion of individuals with bachelor's degrees.
Using the above models, we estimate the relationship between the observed medication utilization and the observed copayment. Then, based on the estimated models, we utilize the method of recycled predictions along with the factual (or counterfactual) copayment to predict the factual (or counterfactual) medication utilization in the VBF group for each part of the two-part model. We then multiply the recycled predictions from the two parts to obtain the final conditional predicted mean factual (or counterfactual) values (Ai & Norton, 2003; Basu, Arondekar, & Rathouz, 2006; Karaca-Mandic, Norton, & Dowd, 2012) . The factual and counterfactual copayments and medication utilization estimates are used to calculate elasticities and welfare changes as described in the following sections.
We accounted for repeated observations by clustering our regressions by member. We assessed overall model fit using the following goodness-of-fit tests: Pearson's correlation test, Pregibon link test, and a modified Hosmer-Lemeshow test (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Pregibon, 1980) . To account for uncertainty in the point estimates and generate p values, standard errors, and confidence intervals, we will use draw 1,000 random bootstrap samples with replacement clustering on the individual member.
| Econometric estimation-PED
We computed elasticities for the total number of fills of a medication using the combined results of the two-part models. We first estimated the overall elasticity for the entire set of medications included in the analysis. We next estimated elasticities for medications in each of the five VBF copayment tiers, then for medications in five therapeutic classes as defined by the American Hospital Formulary Service Pharmacologic-Therapeutic Classification: statins, beta 2 receptor blockers, proton-pump inhibitors (PPIs), angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitors, and biguanides. This classification system is the most widely used drug classification system in the United States and Canada and is used in classifying substitutable drug coverage for US Medicaid and Medicare Part D drug formularies (American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, 2018). We select these classes because of the high prevalence of use. However, it is important to recognize that substitutions could occur more broadly across therapeutic classes. Various healthcare inputs could be considered substitutes for health production, that is, multimorbid individuals may trade-off medications even across conditions to maximize overall health (Grossman, 1999) . The use of a cost-utility analysis framework with a common QALY denominator recognizes such substitution or trade-offs.
Finally, we estimated elasticities for brand versus generic medications. For each group-level elasticity estimate, we weight the drug-specific estimates within that group by the number of fills for each medication in the VBF group in the prepolicy period. We use a nonparametric trend test to assess whether there is a trend in elasticity estimates based on VBF copayment tier placement (Cuzick, 1985) .
| Econometric estimation-welfare effects
We approximate the welfare effects using our regression-based model predictions. We predicted quantity demanded given the factual and counterfactual copayment levels and the quantity demanded given the marginal cost of the medication. Using the predicted quantities and the copayments and the social marginal costs approximated using principles laid out earlier, we calculate these welfare effects as shown in Figure 1 and as follows using the area of a right trapezoid or a triangle. If marginal cost is greater than both copayment levels ( Figure 1a ; SMC > P 1 * > P1 or SMC > P1 > P 1 * ) or if marginal cost is less than both copayment levels ( Figure 1c ; P1 > P 1 * > SMC or P 1 * > P1 > SMC), then the welfare change is
where "P 1 * " is the factual copayment and "Q 1 * " is the factual estimate of demand (i.e., with VBF policy), "P 1 " is the counterfactual copayment, and "Q 1 " is the counterfactual estimate of demand (i.e., if there was no VBF policy). "SMC" is the social marginal cost. We calculate the welfare change (Δwelfare) for each enrollee (i), medication (d), and quarter (t) in the VBF group in the postpolicy period. Under Figure 1a scenario, if factual demand (under VBF) is less than counterfactual demand (under old regime), welfare increases and vice versa. The opposite is true for the Figure 1c scenario.
If the social marginal cost is between the old and new copayment levels (Figure 1b) , then the welfare change is
"MQ" is the quantity demanded when price is at marginal cost and is predicted using our estimated models. We calculate welfare effects at the individual-drug combination level so that we can aggregate the net welfare effects across any drug class or subgroups. Pooling across our two-part models, we estimate net welfare change induced by VBF copayment changes at the individual-drug combination level. We calculate the aggregated welfare effects separately for medications with decreases in copayment and those with increases. We next obtain the overall welfare change across enrollees, medications, and quarter by calculating the sum of the welfare changes:
| RESULTS
The intervention group and control group were composed of 5,235 and 4,357 individuals, respectively ( Table 2 ). As our unit of analysis is at the individual-quarter-drug level, we have over 20 million observations. Notably, the intervention group had slightly higher median household income ($68,900 vs. $66,100) and were slightly younger (32.9 years vs. 33.9 years). As specified a priori, we controlled for these and other characteristics. The unadjusted percentage of prescriptions filled by the mail order pharmacy benefit did not differ in the prepolicy and postpolicy periods for the intervention (8.76% vs. 8.54%) or control group (7.95% vs. 7.32%). Both before and after applying the study requirement of continuous enrollment in the prepolicy period, the rates of attrition (results not shown) did not differ between VBF and control groups in the prepolicy and postpolicy periods. In a previous study, we evaluated the impact of this VBF policy on medication expenditures from member, health plan, and member plus health plan (overall) perspectives (Yeung, Basu, Hansen, et al., 2017) . We also measured as secondary outcomes, medication utilization, emergency department visits, hospitalizations, office visits, and nonmedication expenditures using these data over a slightly longer period of time. The VBF decreased member plus health plan medication expenditures by $8 per member per month or 10%, which translates to a net savings of $1.1 million. Utilization of medications moved into lower copayment tiers increased by 1.95 days' supply or 17%. Total medication utilization, health services utilization and nonmedication expenditures did not change. There were no differences in preperiod trends between the intervention and control group in magnitude or statistical significance, which supports the parallel trends assumption for our difference-in-difference strategy (Figure 2 ; Yeung, Basu, Hansen, et al., 2017) . Figure 3 shows the regression-based predictions of a $1 increase in copayment on the quarterly probability of fill per member (i.e., first part of the two-part model; Figure 3a ) and the number of fills per member for each drug conditional on having a fill (i.e., second part of the two-part model; Figure 3b ) as well as the total number of fills per member (i.e., combination of the two-part model; Figure 3c ). As suggested by our composite elasticity formulation, some medications had predicted increases in quantity demanded despite copayment increases. However, for each measure of quantity, there were more medications with predicted decreases than increases in quantity demanded. It is also important to note that the effect of the price change manifest mostly on the intensive margin (Figure 3b ) rather than the extensive margin of fills (Figure 3a) . Table 3 Columns 4 and 5 presents the mean copayment changes that occurred as a result of the VBF overall and by VBF copayment tier. For example, overall, mean copayments decreased by $10 for medications that had decreases, and mean copayments increased by $9 for medications that had increases. All medications had either an increase or decrease in copayment. We find that overall PED was −0.16 (95% CI [−0.23, −0.09]; Table 3 ). Hence, a doubling of copayment faced by the enrollees in this study is expected to reduce the quarterly number of fills of a medication by 16%.
Our elasticity estimates by VBF copayment tier were −0.09 (95% CI (Table 3) . Based on the trend test, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no trend in elasticities comparing copayment tiers (p < 0.001). This suggests that patients seem to be more price sensitive to drugs placed in higher ICER-informed copayment tiers than to drugs placed in lower ICER-informed copayment tiers given the VBF design.
More importantly, as expected based on the theoretical discussions in the previous section, we find that for VBF Tier 1 drugs, which represent good value, price elasticity was larger for those that experienced price decreases but smaller for those that experienced price increases. Similarly, for drugs placed in higher VBF tiers, which represent lower value, price increases were associated with much higher price elasticities.
The elasticity estimates for statins, beta blockers, PPIs, angiotensin-converting-enzyme inhibitors, and biguanides were (Table 4 ). The branded PPI are expected to show higher elasticity to price due to the availability of nonprescription substitutes (generic PPI and Histamine H 2 receptor blockers). More importantly, within a drug class, where each drug can be considered to be substitute for each other, PEDs align with the theoretical predictions. For example, within the statins group, statins that increased in price (indicating low value; brand name atorvastatin and rosuvastatin) have substantially higher PED than their high-value counterparts (generic lovastatin, pravastatin, and simvastatin).
Our estimates for branded and generic medications were −0.76 (95% CI [−0.86, −0.65]) and −0.03 (95% CI [−0.09, 0.04]), respectively (Table 4) . These estimates are also consistent with published estimates (Gibson, McLaughlin, & Smith, 2010; Goldman et al., 2004) .
Overall, we find that the welfare increases due to copayment increases more than offset the welfare loss from copayment decreases. We find that for medications with copayment increases, total welfare gain was $210,000 for the cohort in the postolicy period or $40 per member. For medications with copayment decreases, welfare loss was −$63,000 or −$12 per member; therefore, the net welfare gain was $147,000 for the cohort or $28 per member. Assessing welfare changes by copayment tiers, we find that there was net welfare loss in the preventive tier (−$62,000), primarily due to decreases in demand prices, and net welfare gains in Tiers 1 ($97,000), 2 ($89,000), 3 ($18,000), and 4 ($4,000).
| Robustness checks
We conducted a series of robustness checks in which we (a) required individuals to be enrolled for the entire period of study or (b) limited our period of observation to 3 or 6 months before and after policy implementation or (c) included an interaction term for the fixed effects for drug and health plan (plan p *rx d ) to account for differing levels of drug-specific utilization by health plans. The results from all these robustness checks are similar to the findings of our primary analysis (Table 5) . 
[16, 26]
Note. ACE: angiotensin-converting enzyme.
| DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this study, we present a formal framework to explain consumer medication utilization behavior in the context of differential changes in demand prices (copayments) that incorporates cross-price elasticity and own price elasticity effects into a model of observed composite elasticity. Specifically, our model predicts that when copayments decrease for a (high value) medication and increase for its (low value) substitutes, we would find greater price elasticity than would be expected had either the medication or its substitute been subject to a copayment change (but not both). We further extend our model to predict welfare effects. All else being equal, our model predicts that welfare loss due to copayment decreases for high-value medications (which we expect to have inelastic demand) will be smaller than welfare gains from copayment increases for low-value medications (which we expect to have elastic demand). We empirically estimated the composite PED and welfare changes in a VBF that had differential changes in copayments. Our overall elasticity estimate of −0.16 is similar to the estimate from the RAND health insurance experiment and the estimates from observation studies using instrumental variable methods. Our work also offers a more explicit explanation of the surprising finding that the enactment of Medicare Part D had reduced manufacturer prices for branded medications (Duggan & Scott Morton, 2010) . Our framework shows that formularies can increase differential prices for a drug and its substitutes, resulting in greater elasticity (and therefore lower manufacturer prices).
For the elasticity estimates by copayment tiers, we observed a trend of increasing elasticity with increasing copayment tiers. That is, consumers seemed to be more price sensitive to medications placed into higher copayment tiers. This may be a consequence of the VBF policy's assignment of tiers according to value (as value may very well be correlated with own PED). This may also be due to the substitution effect of the VBF policy: to cause substitution of medications in higher copayment tiers for medications in lower copayment tiers. As evidence of the latter effect, we observed that for medications placed in copayment Tier 1, medications with decreases in copayment were much more elastic than medications with increases in copayment. This suggests that there was substitution of higher copayment tier medications for medications in Tier 1 that had either increases or decreases in copayment.
Further, although not statistically significant, the point estimate for composite PED was positive for generic medications with copayment increases. This suggests that the own price effect resulting from the copayment increases for these medications was smaller than the substitution effect resulting from the copayment increases for branded medications, as we had suggested was theoretically possible in a VBF. In other words, the fact that consumption goes up for generic medications that had copayment increases is suggestive that these medications had substitutes that had even greater copayment increases. This is corroborated by the fact that the increases in copayments were relatively small for generic medications that had copayment increases ($6) compared with branded medications that had copayment increases ($21) and that 80% of generic medications that had increases in copayment were in therapeutic classes for which there was another medication with even greater copayment increases. Future studies should investigate these alternative explanations as well as explore the association of PED with value in nondrug sectors such as the quality of physician services.
We also found that the net effect of the VBF on welfare was positive. That is, the welfare gain due to copayment increases more than offset the welfare loss due to copayment decreases. There may be multiple reasons for this finding. It may be that there were more medications with copayment increases, the magnitude of the copayment increases were larger than the copayment decreases, and the overall utilization of medications with copayment increases were greater. Indeed, we find evidence for these factors as the overall mean utilization-weighted copayment across all medications increased comparing the post VBF period to the pre-VBF period. The substitution effect may also contribute to the finding. The differential changes in copayments resulted in greater composite elasticity for medications with larger copayment increases (low value) because their high-valued substitutes may be experiencing lower copayment increases or copayment decreases. Similarly, the VBF generates lower composite elasticity for medications with smaller copayment increases (high value) as their low-valued substitutes are experiencing larger increases in copayments. These results should be considered while acknowledging several limitations. First, Premera is a health plan, and the ICER estimates are largely drawn from the health plan perspective, instead of a societal perspective. Hence, this policy may optimize insurance based on the payer perspective ignoring costs and benefits accrued to care givers and other spillovers, and therefore, the elasticity estimates may not necessarily generalize to a social insurance plan. Practically, the availability of cost-effectiveness evidence from a true societal perspective is limited. Second, practical limitations of pharmacy claims adjudication systems result in imprecision in matching value to copayments. Typically, the clinical indication for a medication is unknown to the health plan (or pharmacy claims adjudicator) at the time of fill. Therefore, the health plan assigns the same copayment to a medication regardless of indication. However, ICER estimates may vary across indications for a single medication. Practically, the VBF assigns medications to copayment tiers based on the ICER estimate for the indication with the highest prescription volume. This imprecision does not bias our mean elasticity estimates (as the analysis was performed at the medication level) but does impact the welfare change estimates. More precise matching of value to copayments is expected to increase the estimated effect of the VBF on welfare loss reduction. Third, the study population is comprised of employees and dependents of a health insurance firm. To the extent that these individuals are better informed about the marginal benefits of treatment and are better aligned to their optimal therapy, they are less likely to reduce utilization. Although it is also possible that this population may be more aware of changes in insurance benefits and this may make them more price sensitive, Premera conducted focus groups of VBF beneficiaries in the year following VBF implementation. These showed that beneficiaries were not aware of the new value-based copayment tiering process (results not shown). Finally, while we did not explicitly model the income effect of the VBF on demand, a separate policy evaluation of the VBF showed that member out of pocket expenditures increased by only $2 per member per month, a very small amount compared with the likely monthly income of this employee population (Yeung, Basu, Hansen, et al., 2017) . Therefore, the income effect is expected to be very small.
Our work suggests that by changing copayments differentially, the substitution effect may be used to either amplify or dampen medication utilization. This in turn may be used to optimize welfare loss changes. We hope that the results in this article presents a clearer picture of the effects of VBF designs on welfare and provide a more intuitive description of price elasticities obtained through such natural experiments. Zeckhauser, R. (1970 
